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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BETTY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 13803

vs.
PERRY A. PETERSON, M.D., et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
VALLEY WEST HOSPITAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
dba VALLEY WEST HOSPITAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a malpractice suit by plaintiff, wherein
she claims that negligence upon the part of defendant
doctor and defendant hospital caused a stillbirth of her
baby.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants against the plaintiff no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment
below.

-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in plaintiff's
brief is not complete and ignores the time-honored rule
that on appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict, the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, in this case the defendants. We, therefore, deem
it necessary to restate the facts.
Plaintiff was a maternity patient of defendant
Dr. Peterson. Her pregnancy proceeded essentially uneventfully until September 2, 1971. On this date she was
overdue for delivery, and was examined by Dr. Peterson in
his office. He performed both an external and internal
examination and advised her that she was ready for delivery, and that she should proceed promptly to the hospital
where labor would be induced.

(R. 338) Dr. Peterson also

called the defendant hospital and gave instructions to
prepare the plaintiff for induction.

(R. 247, 324, 404)

Plaintiff left Dr. Peterson's office in downtown
Salt Lake at about 4:00 p.m.

There was a dispute in the

evidence as to whether she proceeded directly to the defen
dant hospital or whether she stopped at her home for some

-3personal supplies before going to the hospital.
340, 392, 394)
at 4:42 p.m.
labor.

(R. 339-

In any event, she arrived at the hospital
(Ex. 1)

She was not at this time in active

(R. 341, 352, 356-357, 364)

Since she had been

in the hospital a couple of days earlier in false labor,
it was not necessary that she be nprepped,ff but she was
given all of the other routine treatment on admission,
including an external examination by the nurse (vital
signs), an enema was administered, and fetal heart tones
were heard and found to be normal.

(R. 340, 364, 396,

Ex. 1)
At the time of her arrival at the hospital,
there was a complicated delivery taking place in the delivery room, and the O.B. nurse was primarily occupied
with that.

(R. 364, 408-409, 422-423)

Plaintiff was

accompanied by her sister, Jeanette Rex (R. 352, 368), and
she had available at her bedside a call button.

(R. 407)

At no time did she make any complaint of pain or discomfort, nor did she seek the assistance of any hospital personnel.

(R. 328, 341, 352, 356-357, 363, 406, 429-430)
The delivery which was in progress in the deliv-

ery room was completed around 6:30 p.m., and the nurses
then started to prepare the infusion pump for induction of

-4labor.

(R. 341, 365)

Some difficulty was encountered

with the equipment, and eventually one of the nurses
called the head O.B. nurse for advice as to the problem.
At about this time, Dr. Peterson arrived, and either he or
Nurse Rhoads got the machine operating properly.

(R. 344,

366, 413) Dr. Peterson then made a vaginal examination
and discovered that there was a prolapsed cord, and he was
unable to hear any fetal heart tones and concluded that
the baby had died.

(R. 344-345) The baby was ultimately

stillborn at about 8:31 p.m.

(Ex. 1)

The only evidence offered by the plaintiff of
any negligence upon the part of defendant hospital was the
testimony of Dr. Harris. Dr. Harris testified that he had
never practiced at Valley West Hospital and was not familiar with its staff or its capabilities.

(R. 293) However,

he stated that the standard of care in Salt Lake hospitals
would be for a newly-admitted maternity patient to have
both an abdominal and vaginal examination and to listen
for fetal heart tones.

(R. 295) The purpose of the vag-

inal examination would be to determine the status of the
cervix, the condition of the membranes and any protruding
parts which could be palpated.

(R. 295)

-5On cross-examination he admitted that the standard operating procedures are determined by the hospital
staff members of the specialty involved.

(R. 307) He

admitted that an external examination was done in this case
and that fetal heart tones were heard and were within normal range.

(R. 308, 310) The only thing not done at the

time of admission was a vaginal examination.

If the

patient came directly to the hospital from the doctor's
office (as was the case here), there would be no need for
a vaginal examination.

(R. 308)

Even if a vaginal examination had been performed,
there was no assurance that the nurse would have discovered
that the amniotic membrane had ruptured.

This is sometimes

a difficult determination even for a doctor.

(R. 309)

There could be pressure on the cord from the baby's head,
even before prolapse, and this could not be discovered by
a vaginal examination.

(R. 311) He further admitted that

even if the prolapse of the cord occurred before plaintiff's arrival at the hospital, and if it could have been
discovered upon vaginal examination at the time of admission, it was speculative whether the baby could have been
saved.

(R. 312-313)

-6Thus, according to the testimony of plaintiff's
own expert, the only thing omitted by the hospital which
is usually done at the time of admission was a vaginal
examination, and in view of the fact that plaintiff had
just left her doctor's office, that was not indicated.
Even if it had been performed, it was speculative as to
whether the outcome would have been any different.

(R. 312

and 313) As left on cross-examination, Dr. Harris' testimony did not make a prima facie case of negligence, and
left to speculation whether anything the hospital might
have done could have affected the ultimate outcome.
Defendant Dr. Peterson testified that whether a
vaginal examination should be done upon admission to the
hospital, in the absence of instructions from the doctor,
depends upon the judgment of the nurses.

(R. 245, 276)

In some cases the doctor may request it.

In this instance,

Dr. Peterson gave no such instructions and there was no
reason to do so.

(R. 245-246) When Dr. Peterson called

the hospital to arrange for plaintiff's admission, he
advised that the bag of waters was bulging, but had not
yet ruptured, and that plaintiff was not in labor.
(R. 274) He also testified, in harmony with Dr. Harris,

-7that the purpose of a vaginal examination is to determine
the status of the cervix, and that sometimes it is difficult even for doctors to determine whether the amniotic
membrane has ruptured, A nurse might not make that determination even if she performed a vaginal examination,
(FL 275)
Dr. Peterson had no opinion as to when the prolapse of the cord occurred.

It could have occurred at any

time from the time the patient left his office until the
time he saw her at the hospital approximately three hours
laterc

(R. 277) There is no assurance that an examination

would have discovered the prolapse of the cord.

Death of

the baby could have occurred before the prolapse.

It could

have occurred before the time that the most skilled doctor
could have discovered the prolapse.

If the prolapse had

been discovered, the doctor should have been notified.

In

this instance, he could not have taken effective action in
much less than an hour.
expired.

In this time the baby could have

(R. 277-278)
He also testified that the hospital had performed

all of his routine orders up to the time of the birth.
(R. 280, 396) Had he desired further activity on the part

-8of hospital personnel, he would have called the hospital
and directed it.

(R. 396)

Since the patient had just

*

come from the doctor!s office to the hospital and since

I

she was not in active labor and was waiting for induction,

.

the nurses had no occasion to examine her.

(R. 396, 397)

In summary, there was substantial evidence supporting the juryfs finding that defendant hospital had

]
«

conformed to the standard of care of hospitals in this community, and there was no competent evidence from which a

I

jury could find that, even if there had been a departure

i

from the standard of care, that such probably caused the
death of plaintiff's unborn baby.

|

At the outset of the trial, plaintiff's attorney

|

made a motion in limine which was granted in part, and
counsel for the defendants were ordered not to refer to

I

the illegitimacy of the pregnancy or to the fact that

1

plaintiff was on welfare.

(R. 200-206) However, by in-

advertence during the cross-examination of Dr. Peterson,

I

he volunteered both that the plaintiff was on welfare and

I

that the pregnancy was illegitimate.

(R. 268)

Plaintiff's

counsel immediately made a motion for mistrial, which was

*

extensively argued to the court. The court denied the

I

i
i

-9motion for mistrial and concluded that he had erred in
ruling on the motion in limine, and that it was proper to
prove the illegitimacy of the pregnancy and plaintiff's
status as a welfare patient, which were relevant on the
issue of damages.

(Rc 268-273)

Both defendants made motions for directed verdict
at the end of plaintiff's case (R. 372-390) and again at
the conclusion of all of the evidence.
motions were taken under advisement.

(R. 437-438) These
(R. 438) The case

was submitted to a jury, which returned with an unanimous
defense verdict for both defendants.

(R. 18, 456) A sub-

sequent motion for new trial was denied,
and this appeal followed.

(R. 9-10, 15-16)

(R. 5-7)

, ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A
PLAINTIFF'S VERDICT.
Without so much as a single citation of authority,
and based solely upon a review of the record in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, her attorneys contend that
the verdict in this case is unsupported by the weight of
the evidence.

Plaintiff argues:

•

-101. That defendant hospital should have performed

,

an abdominal and vaginal examination upon plaintiff's
admission to the hospital.
Answer:
examination.

The hospital did perform an abdominal

i

(R. 308, 310, 340, 364, 396, Ex. 1) While

Dr0 Harris testified that it was the standard of care in

J

this community to perform a vaginal examination upon admis-

i

sion, he admitted on cross-examination that such was not
necessary in this case, since the plaintiff had had a vag-

|

inal examination at her doctor's office immediately before

1

her admission to the hospital.

(R. 308) Dr. Peterson tes-

tified that in the absence of directions from the attending

I

physician, it was a matter of judgment upon the part of the

I

nurses as to whether a vaginal examination should be done
upon admission to the hospital, and that under the facts

I

of this case, a vaginal examination was not indicated.

1

(R. 245-246, 276, 396, 397)
2.

The standard of care requires an abdominal

and vaginal examination prior to induction of labor.
Answer:

•
I

Labor was not induced until Dr. Peterson

arrived at the hospital. Although the nurses had been working with the infusion pump prior to his arrival, they had

1

i

-11-

not been successful in getting it to operate.
366, 413)

(R. 344-345,

Plaintiff was receiving only glucose solution

and no medication from the equipment prior to the time of
Dr. Peterson's arrival.

(R. 411-412)

Dr. Peterson per-

formed a vaginal examination immediately after the equipment started to operate.

(R. 344-345)

Plaintiff's expert,

Dr. Harris, agreed that this would satisfy the standard of
care of the community.
3.

(R. 311-312)

The standard of care requires hospital per-

sonnel to inquire of the patient upon admission whether
her water has broken.
Answer:

It is speculative at best as to whether

such an inquiry would have elicited any reliable information.

At the trial, plaintiff testified that she did not

know when her bag of waters broke.

(R. 367) At the time

of the incident, she told Dr. Peterson that she experienced
a gush of fluid from the vagina while she was at home,
between her examination by Dr. Peterson and her admission
to the hospital.

(R. 392, 394, 427, Ex. 1) However, at
#

trial, plaintiff denied that she went home between the time
she left Dr. Peterson's office and the time she arrived at
the hospital. (R. 339-340)

-12The problem of causation is even more tenuous.
Dr. Harris admitted on cross-examination that it was speculative (1) whether the cord had prolapsed at the time of
plaintiff's admission to the hospital (R. 309); (2) whether
it would have been discovered by a vaginal examination by
a nurse even if it had prolapsed (R. 309); and (3) whether,
under the circumstances, the baby could have been saved
even if a prolapsed cord had been discovered upon admission
to the hospital.

(R. 312-313) The testimony of a witness

is no stronger than it is left on cross-examination.
Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021.
While our research has discovered no cases
closely similar in point of fact, we believe that the
cases discussed below^establish the applicable law:
In Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021,
a young mother died following childbirth.

The court held

that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable
in an obstetric case. The court likewise held that a
verdict could not be based on conjecture or speculation.
Said the court:
ff

. . . A verdict of a jury may not be
based on such conjectures. Peterson v.
Richards, 73 Utah 57, 272 P. 229; Baxter
v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257.

-13f,

In order to recover in such case the
plaintiff must show that in treatment of the
patient the defendant physician did not
exercise such care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled physicians
doing the same type of work in the vicinity,
and that the want or failure of the required
skill and care was the cause of the injury
complained of. That there might have been
neglect or lack of skill is not enough. To
permit a cause to go to the jury on testimony
showing only possibility, or what might or
could have happened, is to permit a jury to
base a verdict upon conjecture, speculation
or suspicion." (Emphasis added.)
In Moore v. D. & R.G.W. Railroad Company, 4 Utah
2d 255, 292 P.2d 849, plaintiff's doctor testified that it
was "possible" that plaintiff had a herniated disc. This
court held that the trial court committed error in refusing to take from the consideration of the jury the issue
of whether plaintiff had a herniated intervertebral disc.
This court held that under that evidence the existence of
a herniated disc was at best speculative and a verdict
could not be based upon such evidence, and the verdict and
judgment were reversed.
To the same effect see Jackson v. Colston, 116
Utah 295, 209 P02d 566.
In the case of Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-Day
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935, this court

-14affirmed a defense verdict and judgment in a suit against

i

a hospital, saying:
"What the parties are entitled to and
the law seeks to afford is an opportunity
for one claiming a grievance which would
justify legal redress to present it to a
court or jury and to have a fair trial.
When this is done, and the verdict and
judgment are entered, all presumptions are
in favor of their validity. The burden is
upon the appellant not only to show that
there was error, but that it was prejudicial to the extent that there is reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there would
have been a different result. We find no
such error here.11
That language is fully applicable here.
At the top of page 5 of plaintiff's brief, it is

j
|
|
j
I
1
I
|
I
1
1

argued "that the hospital and/or doctor breached the standard of care in the community . . . M This is a claim

•

which smacks of res ipsa loquitur.

]

A similar argument was

rejected in the case of Talbot v. W. H. Groves1 Latter-Day
Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872. This court specif-

•

ically rejected the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as

I

against a hospital and two doctors, where plaintiff failed
to show which of the defendants was in charge of the offending instrumentality, or the management of the case, at the
time plaintiff's injury occurred.

In Denny v. St. Markfs

I
.

Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944, this court held

i

-15that there was no competent evidence to support a finding
that plaintiff was injured as a result of manipulation of
her body while X-rays were being taken, and affirmed a
directed verdict for the defendant.
Not only is the jury's verdict adequately supported by the evidence, but in fact there is no competent
evidence which would support a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.

The respective motions of the defendants for

directed verdict should have been granted, and the judgment below should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING TESTIMONY
AS TO THE PATERNITY AND ILLEGITIMACY OF
PLAINTIFF'S STILLBORN CHILD.
Again, without any citation of authority, plaintiff urges that the court erred in permitting evidence
concerning the identity of the father of the stillborn
child, and of the child's illegitimacy.

As noted in our

Statement of Facts, the court at the outset of the trial
granted plaintiff's motion in limine, prohibiting defense
counsel from inquiring into the paternity and legitimacy
of the baby.

By inadvertence, the fact of the baby's

illegitimacy came out in an answer by Dr. Peterson to a

-16question propounded by counsel for the hospital. Plaintiff's counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, and at
this point the matter was re-argued.

The judge then be-

came convinced that, in view of plaintiff's claims for
mental anguish arising out of the stillbirth, all of the
facts surrounding the pregnancy became relevant and material and that, in fact, defendants would have been unfairly
prejudiced if such evidence had been suppressed.
Under Rule 45, Rules of Evidence, the trial
judge is vested with a wide discretion in weighing the relevance of evidence as against any collateral prejudicial
or distracting effect that it may have.

In the absence of

a showing of abuse of that discretion, such rulings cannot
be held to be erroneous.
Here the court clearly weighed the conflicting
considerations, and concluded that, on balance, the probative value of the evidence outweighed any inflammatory or
other improper effect that it might have. The ruling was
a considered one, after extensive argument to the court
both at the outset of trial and again on the motion for
mistrial.

Plaintiff has advanced neither facts nor legal

authority which would support a holding that the judge

-17abused his discretion or committed error in receiving the
questioned evidence.
POINT III
THIS STATE DOES NOT RECOGNIZE AN ACTION FOR
THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF AN UNBORN CHILD.
We do not believe that the court will reach
Point III.

If defendants' position under Points I and II

is sustained, Point III becomes moot.
We recognize that in recent years a line of
authority has developed supporting the principle that an
unborn but viable fetus is a legal person, and that legal
action may be maintained either by it for prenatal injuries
or by its parents for prenatal death.

However, these hold-

ings are not the tidal flood which they are painted to be
by plaintiff's counsel.
Many respected courts of last resort continue to
adhere to the traditional rule, that an unborn child is
not a legal person, and that no action will lie for its
wrongful death.

California and New York, two of the most

liberal jurisdictions in the country, continue to adhere
to this principle.

Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361,

100 Cal. Rptr. 212; Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478,
301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901. The highly respected

-18Supretne Judicial Court of Massachusetts also adheres to
this view.

Leccese v. McDonough, (Mass.) 279 N.E.2d 339.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425, placed its decision
on the highly practical ground that there can be no evidence from which to infer a pecuniary injury resulting
from the wrongful prenatal death of a viable fetus. Said
the court:
11

. . . We have based our decision on the
ground there can be no evidence from which to
infer 'pecuniary injury resulting from1 the
wrongful prenatal death of a viable child en
ventre sa mere; it is all sheer speculation.
Consequently, it is not necessary for us to
decide in this case the debatable question as
to whether a viable child en ventre sa mere,
who is born dead, is a person within the meaning of our wrongful death act. See Graf v
Taggert, supra, at p.143 of 204 A2d 140."
( Emphasis added.)
Other cases wherein recovery has been denied are:
Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Fla.), 213
So.2d 695; McKillip v. Zimmerman, (Iowa), 191 N.W.2d 706;
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, (111. App.) 279 N.E.2d 440;
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229;
Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140; Padillow v.
Elrod (Okla.), 424 P.2d 16; Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn.
614, 371 S.W.2d 433; and Lawrence v. Craven Tire Company,

-19210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440. Analogous to these cases is
State v, Dickinson (Ohio), 263 N.E.2d 253, holding that a
viable unborn fetus is not a person within the meaning of
the automobile homicide statute.
Although the case of Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435,
132 P.2d 114, is not strictly in point since it does not
involve a viable fetus, the language of this court in that
case appears to be pertinent:
11

. . . While injuries resulting in a
miscarriage are actionable, and compensation
may be awarded for the physical and mental
sufferings experienced by a woman who has a
miscarriage by reason of injuries caused by
the wrongful acts of others, damages are not
awarded for 'loss of the unborn child1
itself."
We respectfully suggest that that language would be equally
appropriate to the facts of this case, and that this court
would remain in good judicial company by adhering to the
traditional rule.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff had a full and fair trial upon the
merits of her case which was determined by a jury.

All

presumptions are now in favor of the validity of the proceedings below.

Plaintiff has demonstrated no error and

-20indeed has failed to establish even a prima facie case.
She received all that she was entitled to and more in the
trial court. The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Christensen, Gardiner,
Jensen & Evans
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondent
Valley West Hospital
Development Corporation,
dba Valley West Hospital

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing respondent's
brief was served on Hansen & Orton, Beneficial Life Tower,
36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and
Raymond A. Hintze, Suite #273, Cottonwood Mall, 4835 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, attorneys for
appellant; and on John H. Snow, attorney for respondent
Peterson, 7th Floor, Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, by mailing two copies thereof, postage
prepaid, on the

day of May, 1975.
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